Nobody gives
anything up.
A supplier finance programme that only helps one side gets cancelled at the first budget review. This one changes nothing about the operator’s terms, its cash timing, or its accounting.
For the mining operator
Everything below costs the operator nothing and requires no cash to move earlier than it already does.
| Payment terms stay exactly as they are We never ask for an extension. That is what keeps the balance a trade payable rather than debt, and it is the sentence that gets the signature. |
| A subcontractor base that stays solvent Local sourcing is a legal obligation, not a preference. A subcontractor that fails from cash starvation is a compliance and continuity problem, not just a procurement one. |
| Fewer price premiums for slow payment Suppliers price 60-day risk into their quotes. Remove the risk and the quotes fall. That saving lands on the operator’s cost line, not ours. |
| Fewer stoppages and demobilisations Unpaid haulage and drilling contractors stop work. Restarting a demobilised crew costs more than the invoice that caused it. |
| Documented supply chain ownership The programme produces a verified record of who supplies the site and who owns them, refreshed as ownership changes. That record is what a buyer, an auditor or a regulator asks for when they need to establish where an input came from. |
| A fraud control the operator does not have to build Irregularities we find inside the operator’s own payables are reported to their internal audit at no charge. It is their money being stolen. The control description is available to counterparties under agreement. |
| No cash, no security, no guarantee from the operator The only obligation is to pay a confirmed invoice, on its existing due date, to a US account instead of a local one. |
For the Congolese supplier
On a $100,000.00 invoice at 60 days.
| Cash today instead of in two months $87,500.00 on the day of purchase, $6,500.00 when the operator pays. $94,000.00 in total. |
| A published price they can compute themselves 1% plus 2.5% per 30 days. No negotiation from a position of desperation, and no discount that scales with how badly they need the money. |
| Bid for larger contracts Working capital is what caps contract size. A subcontractor that can fund a mobilisation can tender for work it currently has to decline. |
| No property, no personal collateral We underwrite the operator’s confirmation, not the supplier’s balance sheet. |
| Pay their own crews on time The liquidity shortage does not stop at the subcontractor. It runs down to wages. |
| A payment record that builds into a credit history Clean cycles raise their exposure cap. After enough of them, that record is bankable elsewhere. |
What it costs them
- Origination
- $1,000.00
- Discount, 60d
- $5,000.00
- Total
- $6,000.00
- As a rate
- 6%
Compare against the alternative actually available to them, which is not a bank loan. It is stopping work.
For the United States
The argument to make in Washington, which is stronger than the mining one.
A subcontractor that fails from cash starvation is replaced by whoever has working capital. The supplier layer is where economic influence compounds, quietly, without a single headline.
Keeping Congolese subcontractors solvent preserves local ownership in dollars-per-job terms that no mine acquisition can match, and it does so through a US-owned company collecting into US accounts.